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Abstract: While Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan remains the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s headline decision for labour law in 2015, Mounted Police 
Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General) arguably further developed the 
Court’s continuing reappraisal of freedom of association. Mounted Police provided some 
direction as to the content of a ‘meaningful pursuit of workplace goals’. The guidance 
can be categorised in terms of process and outcome where the former constitutes the 
content of freedom of association and the latter is viewed as sitting outside of its 
protection.    
 
I. Introduction 
Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney-General) has been identified as a demarcation point for the 
interpretation of freedom of association.
1
 In overruling the long-established rule from 
Hersees of Woodstock v Goldstein
2
 in RWDSU, Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola Canada 
Beverages (West) Ltd.,
3
 though, the Supreme Court signalled a willingness to depart from 
past precedents. Ever since its decision in Health Services and Support – Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Association v British Columbia, where ‘the concept of freedom of 
association [was interpreted as including the] notion of a procedural right to collective 
bargaining’4, there has been debate regarding the content of the freedom of association 
pursuant to s.2(d) of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 5  Mounted Police 
Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General),
6
 the focus here, supplemented the 
existing content of freedom of association.   
 
While Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan
7
 remains the headline 
decision for labour law in 2015, Mounted Police continued the elaboration of freedom of 
association. Certainly Saskatchewan changed Canadian labour law textbooks: s.2(d) of 
the Charter gives effect to a right to strike, thereby setting aside the interpretation from 
1987 that freedom of association was an individual right, accorded a limited 
interpretation. Nevertheless, consider the legislation struck down. Through the Public 
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 The City Law School, City University London  
1
 2001 SCC 94 [Dunmore]. Bastarache J (for the majority) identified a purposive approach which 
recognized connections and differences between the individual and the collective: ‘the law must recognize 
that certain union activities — making collective representations to an employer, adopting a majority 
political platform, federating with other unions — may be central to freedom of association even though 
they are inconceivable on the individual level.’ This reasoning departed from that of Le Dain J (among 
others) who denied collective bargaining was a fundamental right or freedom: Reference Re Public Service 
Employee Relations Act (Alberta) [1987] 1 SCR 313 [Alberta Reference], 391.  
2
 (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 449 (ONCA) [Hersees]. 
3
 2002 SCC 8. 
4
 Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia 2007 SCC 27 
[Health Services], [66].   
5
 Canada Act 1982, c. 11, Sched. B (U.K.) [Charter]. 
6
 2015 SCC 1 [Mounted Police]. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is a national police force with 
jurisdiction over matters crossing provincial borders. Where no other exists, it is also the local police force.  
7
 2015 SCC 4 [Saskatchewan]. 
 2 
Service Essential Services Act,
8
 the provincial government granted itself unilateral 
authority to declare any public sector workers as ‘essential service employees’; 
prohibiting them from participating in strike action. The Act contained no meaningful 
mechanism for resolving bargaining impasses.
9
 Moreover, the identification of essential 
service employees was even beyond adjudication by a labour relations board. Given the 
scope of the legislation, surprise would have been slight that such a one-sided statute was 
found to have violated s.2(d). Instead, Mounted Police provided some further direction as 
to the content of a ‘meaningful pursuit of workplace goals’. The guidance can be 
categorised in terms of process and outcome where the former constitutes the content of 
freedom of association and the latter is viewed as sitting outside of the right.       
 
II. The decision to reverse a recent precedent 
In the opening of Mounted Police, Chief Justice McLachlin and Lebel J. (for the 6:1 
majority) outlined this lengthy decision:  
whether excluding members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) from collective 
bargaining[
10
] … and imposing a non-unionized labour relations regime violates the guarantee 
of freedom of association in … the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This requires us 
to review the nature and interpretation of the right … and to clarify the scope of the 
constitutional protection of collective bargaining [as outlined in the Court’s recent decisions on 
s.2(d) of the Charter.]
11
  
Long prohibited from unionizing
12
 (even in the midst of significant unionization amongst 
Canadian public sector workers in the 1960s),
13
 RCMP members were barred from 
collective bargaining due to concerns over ‘loyalty and obedience’.14 While the decision 
to prohibit prevailed, it was not a unanimous sentiment at the time.
15
 RCMP members 
were subsequently placed under their own labour relations regime. Voluntary associations 
of RCMP members formed at their own initiative (consisting of the Mounted Police 
Associations of Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec; the two former initiated this case). 
These three associations offered many services akin to those of the standard union such 
as advice and assistance pertaining to discipline and grievances, political lobbying and 
education. Unlike most unions, these associations had no full-time staff nor were they 
recognised for collective bargaining purposes. Members could raise their workplace 
issues through the Staff Relations Representative Program (SRRP), but pay 
considerations were advanced through a separate process called the RCMP Pay Council. 
A third aspect of the system, the Mounted Police Members’ Legal Fund (funded through 
                                                 
8
 SS 2008, c.P-42.2. The Trade Union Amendment Act 2008, S.S. 2008, c.26 was found to comply with the 
Charter; a matter returned to later. 
9
 Saskatchewan (n 7) [89]-[90]. 
10
 Pursuant to the Public Service Labour Relations Act as enacted by the Public Service Modernization Act, 
SC 2003, c. 22, s. 2. 
11
 Mounted Police (n 6) [1]. References omitted.  
12
 Between 1918 and 1974, members were prohibited from engaging in all associational activities pursuant 
to Orders in Council P.C. 1918-2213 and later P.C. 174/1981 (1945). 
13
 With the adoption of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, S.C. 1966-67, c.72.   
14
 Mounted Police (n 6) [18]. 
15
 While the Report of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public Service. (Queen’s 
Printer, 1965) recommended excluding RCMP members, another report, Canadian Industrial Relations: 
The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (Privy Council Office, 1968), suggested federal law 
enforcement officials have the right, subject to limitations. 
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membership dues) provided legal assistance to members relating to workplace issues.
16
 
Of note, in 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the exclusion of RCMP 
members from collective bargaining in Delisle v Canada (Attorney-General).
17
 The Court 
then found no infringement of members’ freedom of association.18  
 
Distinguishing Delisle, the Supreme Court in 2015 found a violation of members’ Charter 
rights attributable to the existing labour relations system denying members ‘a degree of 
choice and independence sufficient to enable them to determine and pursue their 
collective interests’ as well as precluding a process independent from ‘management’s 
influence’. 19  Choice involved accountability: where members selected their 
representatives to work towards collective interests.
20
 Independence reinforced the nexus 
between members’ interests and the activities of the association.21 The majority offered 
two reasons as to why the matter was not engaged in 1999. First, Delisle predated the 
shift towards a purposive approach to s.2(d) promulgated by BC Health and Ontario 
(Attorney-General) v Fraser.
22
 Second, Delisle scrutinised only a portion of the labour 
relations system; whereas in Mounted Police the entire labour relations framework was 
challenged.
23
 These bases may leave some dissatisfied with the explanation.
24
 Still, 
Mounted Police added to the conversation by asserting the importance of choice and 
independence in selecting collective interests as a union.  
 
In labour law decisions of the Supreme Court, Mister Justice Rothstein (retired as of 30 
August 2015) has commonly written in dissent and in Mounted Police he continued his 
opposition. Rothstein J has consistently questioned the majority’s rendering of the 
renovated freedom of association. In this function, his remarks are important 
contributions. In Mounted Police, the kernel of Rothstein J’s criticism – that the majority 
constitutionalised the Wagner Act model of labour relations
25
 – leads to a noteworthy 
consideration: have the revised parameters of the process effected a particular outcome? 
Rothstein J asserted that RCMP members operated within a labour relations system 
which gave effect to their s.2(d) rights. Recalling Fraser which acknowledged differing 
labour relations systems outside of the Wagner Act model, he characterised the SRRP as 
avoiding ‘the adversarial, Wagner model of labour relations prevalent in much labour 
legislation in Canada’.26 
 
Throughout his labour law opinions, Justice Rothstein valued deference to the legislative 
                                                 
16
 The SRRP and the Legal Fund satisfied the Ontario Court of Appeal, in part, that RCMP members could 
effect collective workplace goals: Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General) 
2012 ONCA 363 [Mounted Police (ONCA)], [128]. 
17
 [1999] 2 SCR 989 [Delisle]. 
18
 A further review (The SRR Challenge 2000 Review) arose soon afterwards. Although it brought about 
changes, limitations remained. 
19
 Mounted Police (n 6) [5], [97].   
20
 Mounted Police (n 6) [87]. 
21
 Ibid [88]. 
22
 Ibid [125]. 2011 SCC 20 [Fraser]. 
23
 Ibid [126]. 
24
 The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the matter ‘disposed’ by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Delisle: Mounted Police (ONCA) (n 16) [127]. 
25
 Mounted Police (n 6) [165].  
26
 Ibid [164]. 
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branch; particularly with regards to socio-economic policy
27
 which he submitted required 
flexibility because court decisions may ‘expand Charter rights in such a way as to 
prevent governments from responding to new information or changing social and 
economic conditions.’28 This meant courts should not trench upon labour law but instead 
‘must respect that concerns such as maintaining “the balance between employees and 
employer” and attaining “equilibrium” in labour relations … fall within the proper role 
and expertise of governments and legislatures, not the judiciary.’29 A response to the 
deference argument was not as plainly put in Mounted Police as it was by Madam Justice 
Abella (for the 5:2 majority) in the later decision of Saskatchewan: ‘If the touchstone of 
Charter compliance is deference, what is the point of judicial scrutiny?’30 
 
III. Refining freedom of association 
Mounted Police served as an opportunity for explication on some matters. Looking back 
to the Health Services decision, the right may have been viewed as derivative insofar as 
collective bargaining was the ‘most significant collective activity through which freedom 
of association [may be] expressed in the labour context’.31 The majority in Mounted 
Police clarified: freedom of association ‘is not a derivative of … other rights. It stands as 
an independent right with independent content, essential to the development and 
maintenance of the vibrant civil society upon which our democracy rests.’32 The Court 
continued to rely on the purposive analysis of the right which it defined as requiring 
‘courts to consider the most concrete purpose or set of purposes that underline[d] the 
right or freedom in question.’ 33  Drawing on Dickson CJ’s dissent in the Alberta 
Reference, the Court’s purposive analysis as applied to s.2(d) and labour relations was 
one of power imbalance:
34
  
Freedom of association is most essential in those circumstances where the individual is liable 
to be prejudiced by the actions of some larger and more powerful entity, like the government or 
an employer. Association has always been the means through which political, cultural and 
racial minorities, religious groups and workers have sought to attain their purposes and fulfil 
their aspirations; it has enabled those who would otherwise be vulnerable and ineffective to 
meet on more equal terms the power and strength of those with whom their interests interact 
and, perhaps, conflict.
35
 
And so, three classes of activity were identified for s.2(d) protection: ‘(1) the right to join 
with others and form associations; (2) the right to join with others in the pursuit of other 
constitutional rights; and (3) the right to join with others to meet on more equal terms the 
power and strength of other groups or entities.’36  
 
Another difficulty the Supreme Court addressed in Mounted Police was the test for 
infringement; specifically what was ‘effective impossibility’. 37  In rejecting RCMP 
                                                 
27
 Ibid [161]. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid [162]. 
30
 Saskatchewan (n 7) [76]. 
31
 Health Services (n 4) [66]. See also Fraser (n 22) [46]. 
32
 Mounted Police (n 6) [49]. 
33
 Ibid [50]. 
34
 Ibid [59]. The Court also referred to this as ‘social imbalance’. 
35
 Alberta Reference (n 1) 365-366; cited in Mounted Police (n 6) [57] (emphasis added in Mounted Police). 
36
 Mounted Police (n 6) [66]. 
37
 Ibid [74]-[76]. 
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officers’ claim, the Ontario Court of Appeal relied upon the Supreme Court in Fraser for 
its interpretation of the right;
38
 namely that a Wagner Act Model has not been 
‘constitutionalized’.39 The Ontario court concluded that (unlike RCMP labour relations) 
only where law or government action rendered achieving collective goals ‘effectively 
impossible’ for workers would there be a violation of s.2(d). 40  Refining the test in 
Mounted Police, the premise remained the balance in labour relations between workers 
pursuing workplace goals and (presumably though it is not explicitly stated) employers’ 
focus on the business interests of the undertaking. Within this context, ‘the ultimate 
question to be determined is whether the measures disrupt the balance between 
employees and employer that s. 2(d) seeks to achieve, so as to substantially interfere with 
meaningful collective bargaining . . ..’41 Underlying the notion of disrupting balance was 
the idea of power imbalance that has historically been developed in labour relations.
42
 
The dual purpose of the freedom of association was ‘to prevent individuals, who alone may 
be powerless, from being overwhelmed by more powerful entities, while also enhancing their 
strength through the exercise of collective power.’43 
 
IV. Freedom of association as parameters to a process  
Canadian courts remain empowered to enforce Charter principles and it has been from 
this premise the Supreme Court has based its reasoning. Grounding the departure from 
the 1980s line of authority established in Dunmore
44
 was the ‘full range of associational 
activity’ contemplated by the Charter as well as the meaning given to freedom of 
association by international documents Canada had ratified.
45
  
 
Criticism of the 21
st
 century freedom of association decisions from Canada’s highest 
court has centred on the term ‘constitutionalizing’: linking constitutional rights with the 
labour relations legal apparatus.
46
 Specifically, constitutionalizing labour rights has been 
characterized as part of the ‘much more pervasive global constitutionalization that 
characterizes our contemporary world.’ Continuing her assessment, Professor Fudge 
defined global constitutionalism as precipitating ‘a shift in law’s legitimacy from 
constituent power, the will of the people, and democracy to rights in which ‘courts are the 
hinge elements in the emergence of a comprehensive transnational ‘constitutionalism, 
which integrates and systematically consolidates political institutions operating in the 
national, supranational and transnational domains of global society’.47 Mounted Police 
further exemplified how ‘political actors exercise and legitimate their power’.48 
                                                 
38
 Mounted Police (ONCA) (n 16) [109], [111]. 
39
 Ibid [91]; Fraser (n 22) [44]-[45]. 
40
 Mounted Police (ONCA) (n 16) [111]. 
41
 Ibid (n 6) [72] (emphasis in original). Applied in Saskatchewan (n 7) [77]. 
42
 Ibid (n 6) [68].   
43
 Ibid (n 6) [70]. 
44
 Dunmore (n 1) [30]. 
45
 C087 – Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87) (entry 
into force: 4 July 1948; ratified by Canada: 23 March 1972).   
46
 Thoroughly discussed in R. Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law (OUP, 
2014). 
47
 J. Fudge, ‘Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: Freedom of Association, Collective 
Bargaining and Strikes’ (2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 267-305 [Fudge], 269. 
48
 Ibid 275. 
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Comparison amongst differing labour relations frameworks inevitably leads to questions. 
A prescient query within this discussion (how does the Supreme Court in Fraser fit with 
Mounted Police?) is one with some history to it. In Dunmore, Bastarache J ruled that, as 
compared to RCMP officers in Delisle,
49
 Ontario agricultural workers were not ‘strong 
enough to look after [their] interests without collective bargaining legislation’ and for this 
reason the impugned legislation violated agricultural workers’ freedom of association. 
With Fraser, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act 2002
50
 was found to provide for 
a s.2(d) compliant framework permitting collective representations concerning terms and 
conditions of work to be made to an agricultural employer (though maintaining the 
exclusion from Ontario’s labour relations legislation)51 and requiring that employer to 
listen to or read representations.
52
 Fraser has been characterized as a ‘retreat’53 (as well 
as a ‘hiatus’)54 because the statute protected only a right to make representations. The 
provision teetered at the ‘weaker end’ of the scale of trade union activity because 
representation alone has been a diluted form of action.
55
 To distinguish amongst different 
labour relations processes in Mounted Police, the Wagner Act model was identified as 
‘one example of how the requirements of choice and independence ensure meaningful 
collective bargaining.’56 The threshold to be met in that case was for employees to retain 
sufficient choice over workplace goals and adequate independence from management to 
ensure meaningful collective bargaining. In this context, these are understandable 
additions to the interpretation of s.2(d) insofar as it clarified the content of a meaningful 
pursuit of workplace goals. Situated within the line of recent decisions, however, 
difficulties arise. 
 
Writing to the point of differing models, the Court identified Ontario’s School Boards 
Collective Bargaining Act, 201457 as another regime (‘designated bargaining model’ where 
members’ bargaining agent ‘is designated [by statute] rather than chosen by the 
employees’).
58
 Ontario teachers are a rich (and enduring) source of labour law discussion. 
Since the release of Mounted Police, the Ontario teachers’ collective bargaining framework 
has become more complicated. In October 2015, a media investigation revealed that since the 
Ontario Government changed the collective bargaining system for Ontario teachers (after 
2003), it had been reimbursing teachers’ unions for their expenses during rounds of collective 
bargaining.59 Critics of the Supreme Court’s line of freedom of association decisions may 
                                                 
49
 Dunmore (n 1) [41] referring to the words used in Canadian Industrial Relations: The Report of the Task 
Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968), [253]-[254] as well as Bastarache J’s 
decision in Delisle [31] when he wrote of RCMP officers’ strength to form employee associations despite 
their exclusion from the relevant legislation.  
50
 S.O. 2002, c.16 [AEPA] 
51
 Labour Relations Act 1995, SO 1995, c.1, Sched A, s.3(b.1) as amended by the AEPA, s.18. 
52
 AEPA (n 50) s.5(6) 
53
 A Bogg & K Ewing, ‘A (Muted) Voice at Work? Collective Bargaining in the Supreme Court of Canada’ 
(2011-2012) 33 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 379-416 [Bogg & Ewing], 379. 
54
 Fudge (n 47) 284. 
55
 Bogg & Ewing (n 53) 385. 
56
 Mounted Police (n 6) [94]. 
57
 SO 2014, C.5. 
58
 Mounted Police (n 6) [95].   
59
 ‘Ontario Government’s payments to teachers unions tops $3.7 million’  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontario-premier-wynne-delivers-ultimatum-to-elementary-
teachers/article26950978/ (last accessed: 5 February 2016).  
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rely on the reimbursement situation to, for example, argue the power imbalance against 
workers has been overstated. Moreover, the instance recalled the debate regarding public 
sector unions and their involvement in politics. One view held that public sector unions have 
disproportionate influence on the political process to the point that distortions will arise if not 
held in check.60 Another perspective reflected on the more singular circumstances of public 
sector labour relations insofar as commercial influences (as found in the private sector) are 
replaced by political; suggesting the political is the venue for this form of labour relations.
61
 
 
The reference to the School Boards Collective Bargaining Act 2014 raised another side to the 
threshold of sufficiency of choice and independence over workplace goals. Ontario teachers’ 
collective bargaining had been conducted between the local unit of the relevant union and the 
local school board. The 2014 Act bifurcated the process so that ‘central’ and ‘local’ 
bargaining takes place. Preeminent was the scope of bargaining at the ‘central’ level,62 as 
there has been no provision outlining the content of local bargaining.  Finally, the current 
influence of Ontario teachers’ unions raised a question as to what the Supreme Court may 
have endorsed by using them as a reference. Relations between teacher unions and school 
boards became increasingly acrimonious between 1969 and 1975.
63
 Labour unrest 
amongst teachers steadily increased to the point that in the mid-1970s the situation 
reached impasse. Strike action being unlawful, teachers employed the only remaining 
substitute, mass resignations.
64
 Though reluctant to intervene, the Ontario Government 
established a statutory labour relations framework exclusive to public sector education, 
the School Boards and Teachers’ Collective Negotiations Act. 65  The School Boards 
Collective Bargaining Act 2014 stood as the latest version of the 1970s example. The 
chances of another cohort (such as agricultural workers) effecting a similar response would 
be slight. The question then is where there has been a weak history of collective pursuit of 
common workplace goals there will be a lower threshold for meeting the standard of a 
meaningful process, than a situation where there has been a framework of labour relations 
borne out of a history of industrial conflict where a strong union (or unions) has emerged. 
 
                                                 
60
 R Clark Jr., ‘Politics and Public Employee Unionism: Some Recommendations for an Emerging Problem’ 
(1975) 44 University of Cincinnati Law Review 680-689, 680: ‘collective bargaining in the public sector 
must take place in a political environment. … too little attention has been paid to the political aspects of 
public sector collective bargaining and the potential problems and distortions of the political process that 
will result if remedies are not instituted.’ 
61
 S Fredman & G S Morris The State as Employer: Labour Law in the Public Services (Mansell 1989), 7-
8: ‘the government derives the revenue to pay its employees primarily from taxation and … this allows 
governments when dealing with their employees to override commercial concerns in favour of political and 
macroeconomic factors. This has a particularly important impact on the role of industrial action in the 
public services. It is unusual for industrial action to have a substantial financial effect on government. 
Instead, trade unions rely on the political pressure which may result from the disruption in services to the 
public. However, governments may decide to ignore whatever political pressure is generated and withstand 
a strike if such a strategy is deemed to be politically desirable.’ 
62
 Sections 24 and 28.  
63
 B M Downie, Collective Bargaining and Conflict Resolution in Education: The Evolution of Public 
Policy in Ontario (Industrial Relations Centre Queen’s University 1978) 6. 
64
 There had been fairly significant success in this tactic: S Lawton, G Bedard, D MacLellan and X Li, 
Teachers’ Unions in Canada (Detselig Enterprises Ltd 1999) 31.   
65
 SO 1975, c.72; repealed by Education Quality Improvement Act, SO 1997, c.31. 
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V.  Scope for a government-directed outcome   
The opinion in Mounted Police suggested scope for steering a process without effecting a 
particular outcome. Between process and outcome, government can affect a labour 
relations system.  
 
In Mounted Police, the majority refined the basis for enforcement: first, there must be 
disruption to the balance between employees and employers; and second, this disruption 
must substantially interfere with meaningful collective bargaining.
66
 These points were 
referenced to Health Services
67
 which relied upon Bastarache J’s ruling in Dunmore.68 
This benchmark (which the Mounted Police majority viewed as the proper construction 
instead of its earlier formulation of ‘effective impossibility’) recalibrated the interaction 
between workers (through union representation) and their employers.
69
 The majority 
perceived a need for reassessment that reduced imbalances.
70
 Mounted Police left open 
the scope beyond the process of selection of representatives and the collective interests 
pursued. It omitted guidance on the apparatus of labour relations, particularly the expanse 
between interference and substantial interference. It is this area that remains relatively 
uncharted, except to the point that the guide through the terrain has been identified as the 
court.   
 
Released on the same day, Meredith v Canada (Attorney General)
71
 fits within this 
discussion. Against the backdrop of the Great Recession, the plaintiff RCMP members of 
the National Executive Committee of the Staff Relations Representative Program 
challenged, pursuant to s.2(d), both the (December 2008) decision of the Treasury Board 
as well as the Expenditure Restraint Act
72
 which imposed a limit of 1.5% on wage 
increases in the public sector for the 2008 to 2010 fiscal years. The legislation contained 
an exception for RCMP members, permitting them the opportunity to negotiate additional 
allowances (an opportunity that was taken up resulting in ‘significant benefits’).73 The 
challenge did not extend to the constitutionality of the RCMP labour relations process. 
The majority of the Supreme Court (Abella J dissenting) ruled that rolling back wages 
without consultation did not violate s.2(d) of the Charter because ‘the level at which the 
ERA capped wage increases for members of the RCMP was consistent with the going 
rate reached in agreements concluded with other bargaining agents inside and outside of 
the core public administration and so reflected an outcome consistent with actual 
bargaining processes.’74 It was striking that a costs order was made against the RCMP 
members considering Abella J’s dissent: ‘The absence of any real opportunity to make 
representations about the extent and impact of the rollbacks before they were approved 
by Treasury Board had the effect of completely nullifying the right to a meaningful 
consultation process and thereby denied members their s. 2(d) Charter rights. ... [bearing 
                                                 
66
 Mounted Police (n 6) [72]. 
67
 Health Services (n 4) [90]. 
68
 Dunmore (n 1) [16], [23]. 
69
 ‘Strengthen’ would be a debateable term (as others noted herein have done); considering that the power 
to assess labour relations systems more clearly rests with the courts.  
70
 Mounted Police (n 6) [59].   
71
 2015 SCC 2 [Meredith]. 
72
 S.C. 2009, c. 2 [ERA]. 
73
 Meredith (n 70) [29] 
74
 Ibid [28]. 
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in mind that] almost every other bargaining agent in the core public service was 
consulted.’75 It remains unclear if anything can be drawn from the labour relations system 
in Mounted Police being found deficient under s.2(d), whilst a facet of that system was 
upheld in Meredith. 
 
The questions from Meredith were later engaged to some extent in Saskatchewan with 
respect to the Supreme Court’s upholding of the Trade Union Amendment Act, 2008. 
Several provisions narrowed the parameters for certification: increasing the level of 
written support from 25% to 45% for certification; reducing from 6 to 3 months the time 
period for receiving such support; eliminating automatic certification where over 50% of 
employees have provided written support; excluding an employer’s communication 
(regarding facts and opinions) with workers during a certification drive from the scope of 
an unfair labour practice. Adding a certain amount of pressure to unions, decertification 
could be achieved with the written support of 45% of membership (down from 50%). 
While these changes were found ‘not [to] substantially interfere with the freedom to 
freely create or join associations’,76 these types of amendments are rarely (if ever) put 
forward to better facilitate freedom of association. Though utilizing international 
documents to ground its decisions in the area,
77
 the Supreme Court also laid down a clear 
distinction: it would not go so far as ILO bodies in interpreting the mechanisms for 
protection of freedom of association.
78
 Furthermore, the highest court would also permit 
government-initiated changes to the labour relations system that could interfere with 
freedom of association.  
 
With this in mind, while the Labour Trilogy of the 1980s has been reconsidered, these 
decisions retain pertinence in some respect. Consider McIntyre J’s explication of labour 
law as ‘based upon a political and economic compromise between organized labour – a 
very powerful socio-economic force – on the one hand, and the employers of labour – an 
equally powerful socio-economic force – on the other.’79 Here was a mixture of the pre-
Dunmore perspective with a consideration persisting through to the current purposive 
approach to freedom of association. An imbalance between labour and employing entities 
grounded (in part) the purposive approach and so a departure from the Alberta Reference 
was discernible. However, the notion of balance remains. With the more recent decisions, 
this rests more with the legislative branch. The facts of the twenty-first century labour 
decisions each spoke of degree within the process: the BC Government was required to 
consult with public sector unions (Health Services); a non-Wagner Act system may be a 
sufficient framework for workers to make representations (Fraser); the unilateral power a 
government vested in itself to determine what constituted essential services (including the 
absence of any framework for review by a labour board) failed to meet a minimum 
threshold for s.2(d) (Saskatchewan); a labour relations system must have ‘a degree of 
                                                 
75
 Ibid [50]. 
76
 Saskatchewan (n 7) [100]. Abella J also noted the trial judge’s assessment that these ‘requirements 
[were] not an excessively difficult threshold’. 
77
 Saskatchewan was called the ‘high water mark’ for the Court’s ‘embrace of international labour rights as 
a basis for interpreting of the Charter’s protection’: Fudge (n 47) 284. 
78
 Professor Fudge further suggested that this ‘interpretive technique allows the Court to preserve its 
exclusive jurisdiction … to determine the constitutionality of legislation or government action’: Fudge (n 
47) 286. 
79
 Alberta Reference (n 1) 414.  
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choice and independence sufficient to enable [members] to determine and pursue their 
collective interests’. 80  Beyond these thresholds, the notion of balance has not been 
meaningfully engaged, thereby leaving open the question of to what extent Canadian 
courts will intervene in the details of a labour relations system. The Canadian Supreme 
Court has set out some of the elements of freedom of association, but it has left scope for 
political and economic compromise, providing for a spectrum of conduct for government. 
The fact of establishing these requirements of degree is not diminished here for it does set 
a new floor of protection in s.2(d). However, the facts of the decisions since Dunmore 
have not provided for consideration beyond. A difficulty raised by Mounted Police has 
been discerning what constitutes balance. Consider the following.  
 
(a) Time limits for the process 
Underlining the developing nature of this area, the consequential effects of the Supreme 
Court’s reading of s.2(d) remain to be considered. One such matter is the time period for 
a meaningful collective bargaining process in pursuit of employees’ goals. Take the 
example of reinstatement of a striking worker to her original position after the end of 
strike action. In the province of Ontario, s.80 of the Labour Relations Act 1995 
contemplated a six-month (continuous) period for lawful strike action; for workers must 
make an ‘unconditional application in writing’ for reinstatement within six months of the 
commencement of the strike action. Would this provision disrupt the ‘balance necessary to 
ensure the meaningful pursuit of workplace goals’ or would it be constitutional under 
s.2(d)? If the latter, does the six-month period suggest a timeline for a meaningful 
collective bargaining process? On the issue, other provinces do not have a similar 
timeline. Alberta’s Labour Relations Code,81 s.90, provided for a two-year period from 
the commencement of a strike or lockout and did not require a settlement for 
reinstatement to occur. Manitoba’s Labour Relations Act,82 ss.11-13, did not expressly 
state any timeline.   
 
(b) Imposing a labour relations framework 
Professor Ewing argued that one result of compliance by the state with its obligations in 
international law is that back-to-work legislation ‘would have to be confined to sectors 
which are essential services “in the strict sense of the term” in the way that term is 
defined by the ILO supervisory bodies.’83  On this point, in December 2015, several 
Ontario public school teacher and staff unions challenged the means by which a 
collective agreement was reached in 2012; alleging the government had violated their 
Charter rights.
84
 Once the government had negotiated an agreement with the Catholic 
teachers union, it sought to establish the same terms and conditions with the remaining 
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three teachers unions through the Putting Students First Act 2012
85
 which contained 
provisions explicitly enforcing these same parameters. The Charter challenge asserted, in 
part, that collective bargaining had been pre-determined by this tactic. With the Act’s 
adoption on ‘an exceptional and temporary basis’,86 this litigation focused not only on the 
process of freedom of association but also a government’s capacity to achieve an 
outcome (to ‘protect the Government’s initiatives for students and preserve jobs’ (as the 
Act’s Preamble stated)) within the parameters of a purposive approach to s.2(d). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The focus of the present work has been to underline, first, that Mounted Police is part of 
an on-going consideration of the protection afforded to freedom of association by the 
Charter. Second, the points made here are intended to contribute to that discussion by 
noting certain matters for further clarification. Carrying on from the labour law decisions 
of 2015, Canadian labour law continues to deliberate upon important queries. The 
question of constitutionalizing labour rights continues; as do the concerns that such a 
movement diminishes the political efforts of unions to effect change for workers or that 
the courts will prevail over the experts, thereby leaving a dysfunctional legislative 
scheme.
87
 For workers, the legal avenue and the political strategy have been pursued 
concurrently for some time. It is only more recently, after many years of litigation, that 
the legal route has borne some measure of success.   
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